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FORUM
SUSPECTED UNAPPROVED PARTS IN THE A l454TION INDUSTRY:
CONSIDERATION OF SYSTEM SAFETY AIM) CONTROL
Steven J. Sletten
It is well known and highly touted that there is a historically high level of safety in U.S. air transportation. The
American traveling public has come to expect this level of safety in the skies. Key elements in maintaining this high
level of air safety are specific federal regulations, along with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) surveillance,
inspection, and enforcement activities. The U.S. Code of Federal Regulations include a framework of rules governing
the design, manufacture, and use of aviation products and parts. The rules are in place to assist the aviation industry
in maintaining its excellent safety record, and serve as a means to prevent unwanted or suspected deficient parts from
being used on aircraft.

In the early 1990s the FAA increased efforts to educate
the public and its own inspectors regarding the potential
safety threat posed by aeronautical parts that do not meet
applicable design, manufacture, and maintenance
requirements. In 1993, the FAA established the Suspected
Unapproved Parts (SUP) Program to coordinate FAA
efforts to minimize safety risks posed by the entry of
"unapproved" parts into the U.S. aviation inventory and
their installation on aircraft (Dept. of Transportation,
1995).
Even though the SUP Program was put in place, there
was still concern within Congress, the Department of
Transportation Office of the Inspector General (OIG), the
public, and the FAA itselfthat the FAA's plan to regulation
and monitoring aviation parts and enforcing the regulations
was not comprehensive enough. The underlying concern
was whether all parts installed on aircraft during preventive
maintenance, routine maintenance, and alteration met all
the necessary FAA requirements (Dept. of Transportation,
1995). If they did not, then safety may be compromised,
and the degree in which the public's safety is potentially in
peril is still up for debate.
The aircraft parts sales market is a $45 billion a year
industry, with growth occurring on a seemingly annual
basis (Paige, 1999). Obviously, with so much money at
stake, all types of people and companies attempt to get in
the aircraft parts business as distributors and brokers. Some
of these individuals are highly qualified, others are not.
This is an area that the FAA has had difficulty in
regulating, and where a breakdown in system safety
processes often occurs. Greed is a strong force, and
unscrupulous people are willing to sell aircraft parts that
are knowingly not airworthy. These are unapproved aircraft
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parts that can be a critical component to aviation safety.
Often, the reason why these parts are unapproved or
"bgbo~~
is because they are old parts that have been altered
to look like new. Suspected unapproved parts (SUPS),now
a euphemism for what was typically called '%ogus parts",
includes everything fiom totally counterfeit parts, to
outdated parts passed of as new, to otherwise airworthy
parts that somehow have been separated from their
certification paper trail or are not manufactured according
to FAA specifications (Paige, 1999). Any aircraft part that
does not have the proper identification paperwork
accompanyingit is considered a suspectedunapproved part,
and should not be installed in an aircraft until proper
testing is conducted.
Even parts that do have accompanying paperwork are
suspect because inconsistencies in the information provided
on the certificates leads to questioning the part's
authenticity. The SUPSproblem that the aviation industry
currently hces is really brought on by the very nature of the
industry itself. The control mechanisms that supposedly
were there to prevent parts from getting back into the repair
system were not heavily enforced by the FAA (Purdue
University, 1995). Also, the air carriers' ability to sell parts
back to brokers, or to scrap yards poses yet another
problem, because these discarded parts are then re-sold
back into the system (Dept. of Transportation, 1994).
Differing views exist concerning how significant the SUP
threat may be to the aviation industry. One area that all will
agree upon is that SUPSdo exist, and have infiltrated into
the aviation industry at manufacturing and maintenance
facilities all across the country. The aviation industry as a
whole has to come to grips with this issue. Although
mechanisms have been put into place to prevent
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unapproved parts fiom being used, there is still more that
can be done. This paper will examine some of the issues
regarding suspected unapproved parts (SUPS) in the
aviation industry, and explore how system safety may be
compromised, regardless of how the regulations currently
in place are implemented.
Discassion
One of the interesting difficulties with the concept of
suspected unapproved parts in the aviation industry deals
with the &ifking views and approaches oftwo Department
of Transportation government offices. Principally, this
difference of viewpoints revolves around the FAA and the
Office ofthe Inspector General (OIG). The FAA has stated
a position that unapproved parts do not pose a significant
safety threat to the air transportation system. They cite the
fact that the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
has indicated that not one commercial airliner accident in
the United States has occurred due to unapproved parts
(Purdue University, 1995). This is not to say that incidents
have not occurred due to unapproved parts, but there is a
distinction between aircraft "incidents" versus "accidents"
in the lexicon of the aviation regulatory community. This
distinction provides a justification by the FAA not to
establish a high regulatory emphasis or funding on the
suspected unapproved parts issue, at least to the level that
the OIG would like to see (Purdue University, 1995).
On the other hand, the Office of the Inspector General
(OIG) believes that unapproved parts, and even suspected
unapproved parts, do pose a significant safety issue to the
U.S. air transportation system (Purdue University, 1995).
Not until relatively recently have aircraft parts been
examined in such detail to determine how they serve as a
''weak link" in the aviation safety chain. The OIG approach
is that SUPS should be deserving of the same regulatory
scrutiny as other air transportation safety issues such as
weapons screening or crew resource management training.
Because there is a contrast in opinion between these two
government agencies, with the FAA seemingto believe that
the OIG's office is on some sort of crusade, the two
government bodies have not always cooperated in the most
productive way. Management has not been jointly
communicating with each other, influencing a system
program implementation. The lack of any FAA regulatory
'%bite9' has also allowed for aviation parts brokers and
distributors to essentially have a fiee reign of the market
place with out fear of retribution.
The civil and criminal penalties are also relatively light
considering the number of deaths that could occur if a
catastrophicparts failure took place in an airbornejetliner.
In fairness to the FAA, there are regulations in place
regarding specificationsrequired by the machine shops that
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manufacture aircraft parts, and the FAA certificate for
these manufacturing operations allows standards to be
recognized and set. Within the aviation industry, it is very
important that parts have the proper FAA certifLing
paperwork accompanying them. It is this industry's "good
house keeping seal" standard that is sought to determine if
a part is airworthy. This allows all people buying and
utilizing a particular part to have some assurance that the
part is authentic and has met certain engineering criteria
regarding part integrity and quality. However, like other
certification programs, there are ways to circumvent the
system and make products, and their associated paperwork,
appear to be authentic to the untrained eye.
Herein lies a problem for the aviation industry when parts
are bought and sold that carry certifyingpaperwork that has
been forged or counterfeited. If an aircraft part does not
have paperwork accompanying it, it is suspect, and
therefore would be considered unapproved. From a systems
safety perspective, there are mechanisms in place to control
suspected unapproved parts flom entering the system, but
there are also gaps in the system that exist. Until these
procedural voids are rectified, there is more of a likelihood
that suspected unapproved parts will continue to enter the
aviation industry, and be installed on aircraft.
In this information age and use of computer chip
technology, there are new ways for parts to be ordered, and
inventoried, such as on a computer data base. Companies
such as Boeing sell a multitude of aircraft parts on their
web page daily (AW&ST, 2000). Boeing has even granted
exclusive distribution rights to another company for its
surplus commercial aircraft parts supply. This will
primarily be for Boeing's out-of-production transports, and
will involve a global sales force and responsibility for next
day shipping and warranty processes (AW&ST, 1999).
Airlines place 4,000 orders daily over the Internet for spare
parts, cutting the average pre-Internet delivery times of
about a week to one day ("Control of the Supply Chain is
Shifting, 1999). This example of business-tebusiness
cybertrade brings about its own set ofsecurity control issues
to contend with, that will unfortunately still allow for SUPS
to exist. For example, a small parts manufacture can now
get on-line and offer customized aircraft parts products at
lower prices than some ofthe larger, more established parts
enterprises. Ifthe intentions of such a small parts firm were
devious, then SUPScould enter the system. The members
of the aviation industry, especially the airlines, have
become more savvy, however, in the realization that if a
part is priced at a very low cost, then there is a high
probability that is authenticity is in question (Purdue
University, 1995). Also, with formal procedures now in
place for reporting suspected unapproved parts, the
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less-than-honest parts broker is often singled out in the
industry so they will not be used. Additionally, as the
number of vendors is being reduced through consolidation,
the mom-and-pop businesses havea harder time competing.
The airlines are more reluctant to trust their business to a
mom-and-pop operation. In the past few years, several
major carriers have reduced their supplier base fiom as
many as 50 vendors down to a core group of 5 to 10
(Nelms, 1998). This, however, is not a guarantee that bogus
or unapproved parts will not trade hands.
A goal aspired to in the aviation industry is to attempt to
place a seal or stamp of approval on every aircraft part
(Purdue University, 1995). Many aircraft parts are too
small to physically have a traditional stamp or seal placed
on them. Often this stamp or seal would is placed on the
box and/or paperwork that accompanies a part.
Opportunities exist for parts to be switched. With the new
use of computer chip technology, there is an effort
underway to place a electronic chip on each part so that the
part can be scanned and pertinent data retrieved (Nelms,
1998). This would help eliminate fbrgery of paperwork,
which has existed for many years in the industry. One of
the ways in which a mechanic or engineer distinguishes
between a bogus part and the real thing is to look for a
trademark. If someone does not bother to place a trademark
on his or her product, it raises suspicion that they may not
be proud of their work. In the past, manufacturers had an
excuse for not putting trademarks on really small parts. It
used to be very difficult, but today there is equipment
capable of making engravings so small you need a
microscope to see them ("Dealing with Bogus Plastic
Parts....", 1998). These electronic chip and trademark
concepts are areas that FAA could consider implementing,
but of course cost is an important consideration that could
slow down any implementation of such a new identifying
system process.
While there is not a "silver bullet" to close the door on
the counterfeit spare parts issue, or resolve the problem of
airworthy, but unapproved parts, a major step in that
direction is the FAA's release of Advisory Circular 21229B that outlines procedures for detecting and reporting
suspected unapproved parts (Nelms, 1998). This advisory
circular is a step in the right direction, but to some, it does
not go k enough in stopping parts distribution fiaud. This
document is only guidance, not regulation, so it is a
voluntary, not mandatory, notification process to the FAA.
Not all cases will be properly reported, and tighter controls
will not be kept. To date, the reported cases of SUPS is
relatively low, yet this is misleading, because one case may
have 100,000 parts involved with it. The FAA has
established regulation requiring that specific certification

procedures for product and parts manufactures be required.
These certificates include the production certificate (PC),
parts manufacturing approval (PMA),technical standard
order (TSO), and production approval holders (PAH).
Supporting parts documentation will indicate that by the
use of such certificates, a part is traceable to an FAAapproved source (Dept. of Transportation, 1998).
The issue of parts traceability will be one of the new
challenges the industry will face. The FAA is cracking
down on the traceability issue. Thoroughly traceable parts
lead to quality material, but as noted earlier will also result
in high cost, and high-tech equipment. This could put a lot
of smaller firms out of business and the cost of such efforts
could be borne by the traveling public. After 2000 there
will be major fleet changes, with newer equipment coming
on-line and supply of spares for aircraft in use drymg up.
Older equipment will not be in demand and carries are
dumping, rather than selling, older equipment and their
spare parts ('Spare Parts in High Demand", 1998).
The military is facing its own dilemma of the lack of
spare parts. No one is making the parts anymore for the
aging military fleet. As a stopgap measure, the military
scavenges it own heaps of retired aircraft and cannibalizes
their own equipment (Freeberg, 1999). Some of the parts
off ofmilitary equipment make it onto commercial aircraft.
Many of these part have civilian and commercial aircraft
applications as well, and as military hardware ages to
historically high levels, these parts are in demand by parts
brokers and distributors (Freeberg, 1999).
Analvsis
In looking at the system of spare parts in the aviation
industry, one cannot help but notice the economic, supply
and demand, nature ofthis industry niche. One also notices
how easy it has been for suspected unapproved parts (SUPS)
to be bought and sold, due to a lack of regulatory oversight
and severe penalties involved. Since the mid- 1990s, there
has been a goad deal of effort taken to try and reduce SUPs
from the marketplace. It appears that the battle is being
one, but as the cliche goes, the war is not over. All of this
effort, however, would not have come to the forefront
without the vocal and legal efforts from people in positions
of authority to speak out about such aviation safety
concerns. The issue as to the significance of safety exists
because the threat of SUPs still remains. The FAA states
that safety is not significantly compromised, yet official
guidelines regarding safety parameters and standards have
not been presented by the FAA (Purdue University, 1995).
This is a level of risk assessment that will have to be
weighed. The process by which the results of risk analysis
are used to make decisions is an important part of the
system safety process. Perhaps, as part of the solution, a
-
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risk assessment matrix could be developed based on the
types of aircraft parts used. This matrix would then suggest
criteria levels, and if they became unacceptable, then
specific SUPSwould be held to higher risk standards than
others (Dept. of Defense, 1997). The level of operational
criticality of each of the thousands of aircraft part in
airplanes do not pose the same threat to safety. A piece of
equipment may malfunction during flight, but then be
properly repaired at the conclusion of the flight, without
incident, or alarm Categorization of parts may be based on
severity, since not all SUPShazards are of equal magnitude
to personal safety (Dept. of Defense, 1997). If the FAA and
the aviation industry can not stop suspected unapproved
parts fiom entering the system completely, then at least
there could be very tight controls and demands place on a
certain type and percentage of parts used in aircraft (e.g.
fan blade parts, brake systems). The focus here would be on
a determined type and percentage of parts, not all of them.
This is a point of consideration that the government and
lawmakers could deliberate further, and eventually could be
a catalyst to help promote total SUPSelimination.
If it remains easy for a scrap dealer to sell aircraft parts
off the lot with no fear of retribution, then the SUP, or
bogus, parts problem is going to persist. There is always a
customer wanting to make a deal, especially if it is an
airline in an economically depressed situation.Not until the
FAA and other law enforcement agencies work effectively
together to catch people conducting this type of selling
activity will it curb the fiaudulent brokers and distributors
fiom making an "easy buck". System safety programs
encounter communication breakdowns, andthe fiction that
exists in this circumstance between the FAA and OIG is
perpetuating a chronic communications gap that must be
closed. Sadly, lack of communication and loss of
information are age-old concerns for most organizations,
even if they are not separate ones, bymg to work together
(Stephenson, 1991). Safety is a line responsibility that
requires everyone to "be on the same page", and work
effectively together throughout the entire structure. This is
not happening with the FAA and the OIG in the manner
that it should be. Too much time and effort seems to be
wasted on internal bickering, issue formalities, and turf
battles. We as citizens of the United States do not need
government organizations of this stature "spinning their
wheels", and delaying effective efforts to resolve a problem,
regardless of how significant or insignificant one may
believe it is. The key here is that a problem does exist, and
safety is influenced by it. The FAA is an agency with the
utmost concern for aviation safety priorities. This agency
needs to provide the staff support necessary to ensure that
the line organization is able to do its job well (Stephenson,
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1991). Interagency cooperation, beyond the Office of
Inspector General (OIG) is an must for reduction in SUPS
in the aviation system. Initial and ongoing training for all
individuals involved in stopping SUPSuse is an important
aspect of good safety pradice beginning as fiu upstream as
possible. This can also help reduce the amount of money
spent on areas such as the SUP enforcement and control
issue (Stephenson, 1991). Safety is achieved by doing
things right the first time. The OIG would contend that the
FAA has not taken this approach. One wuld assess that the
system safety effort to repair the SUPS condition as it
currently exists is more difficult because it is not a fist
time operation. The parts distribution process is one that
has developed over time, and system safety controls could
not ideally be laid out at the infancy of the SUPS
distribution process. The system safety effort should begin
when the project begins and continue through the life cycle
(Stephenson, 1991).
It is true that a major airline accident has not occurred in
the United States due to SUPSbeing used. However, there
have been other events such as a 1989 Norwegian charter
flight that crashed and killed 55 people after a tail section
fastened with unapproved parts tore loose. And, a near
catastrophe occurred in June 1995, in Atlanta, when the
engine of a Valdet DC-9 exploded on takeog hurling
shrapnel through the fuselage, causing a cabin fire, and
injuring passengers. Investigators found the failure
occurred in a replacement part overhauled at a non-FAA
approved repair station in Turkey (Paige, 1999). The SUP
issue is certainly global in nature, and has come close to
directing its influence on American soil.
Incidents, and not accidents, (there is a distinction in
FAA terminology) have occurred in the United States, but
perhaps it is only a matter of time before a SUP is a cause
of a major accident. Perhaps it already has been, but with
millions of parts strewn all over the ground, the cause of
some horrific crashes will never be known. As noted
earlier, not every park ofan aircraft is a critical one, and not
all unapproved parts pose the same threat to safety.
However, if people knew that less than standard (i.e., FAAapproved) parts were involved in the construction of the
aircraft that they were on, then the might have second
thoughts regarding operational safety. Having an imitation
may work well for a fake Rolex watch one buys fiom a local
street vendor, but few passengers may be willing to accept
the same analogy with the parts operating the engines, or
critical flight controls, of a commercial airliner they are
flying in.
The area of SUP and spare parts in general is huge in the
aviation industry. One gets the sense though that the entire
concept of aircraft maintenance and spare parts is

,
;
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undergoing major changes fiom the way it had been for
many years. The aircraft maintenance industry is going
through a evolution of sorts, and the FAA, OIG, and
Congress are pushing concepts that are changing the way
people think about maintenance, and the kind of
commitments that are made to their capital and business
operations. They are in essence providing additional safety
and warning devices that will deter the use of unapproved
parts for being installed on aircraft (Stephenson, 1991).
With the advancement of technology and better ways of
record keeping, improved controlsare being considered and
applied to the aviation parts industry. A safety precedence
sequence is taking form that offers such controls and
warning devices to improve the design of the parts
inventory system (Stephenson, 1991). The establishment of
the Suspected Unapproved Parts Program has gone along
way to help develop a safety precedence, and get a sequence
in place. The aviation industry as a whole should analyze
itself even more closely regarding the SUP issue, by
conducting a operating and support hazard analysis. The
importance of this process is that it helps integrate the
people and procedures into the system, so that weak or
deficient areas can be address (Stephenson, 1991).
Government agencies and people working together requires
more improvement in the battle against SUPS. A complete
project evaluation tree may be used to perform such an
analysis on the current aviation industry SUP reduction
system (Stephenson, 1991). A detailed review of the
procedures, personnel, and tools to accomplish this safety
task is the kind of rude awakening the FAA and the
aviation industry needs to determine gaps, or weak links, in
the SUPSdistribution system.
Conclusion
We all take risks in our lives, and for the most part, we
all try to reduce them when given the chance. As noted in
the beginning of this paper, air travel in the United States
is very safe. It has existed this way with the use of
suspected unapproved parts (SUPS),so why should there be
a concern that air travel will suddenly become a lot more
dangerous now that we know SUPS are being installed?
Some of this revolves around the issue of common sense,
and some of it about looking analytically at a system
process and noting that the system process has a potential
for critical, or even catastrophic, hilure due to SUPS.The
words critical and catastrophicare extreme descriptions for
hazard severity, so it is worth taking notice, and that is
what the aviation industry has done. Risk assessment
description of both severity and probability categories are
taken into account in the approach to system safety
(Stephenson, 1991). Safety is a productive concept and
introducing parts that do not fit industry established
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specifications is non-productive. This has the makings of a
classic case of an upstream effort to eliminate the SUPS
fiom the manuhchuing system and use people, technology,
and techniques to help accomplish this.
We rely on our government to uphold safety standards,
and in some eyes, they have hiled at this. Perhaps
government can use the resources of the private sector to
help accomplish safety goals and set parts manufacturing
standards. In recent times, other parts of the federal
government have emulated private sector approaches to
reduce cost and increase efficiency. Multinational
organizations such as the International AntiCouterfeiting
Organization (IACC) both initiates actions and supports
government actions that will ultimately result in increased
enforcement, lead to the proseation of intellectualproperty
infiinges, and create a strong deterrentto counterfeiters and
pirates (IACC,2000). These organizations can provide
assistance to the FAA and law enforcement agencies.
Federal investigators do a lot to curb fraudulent parts
activities, but as the views of the OIG have expressed, not
enough is being done. Business and industry have a vested
interest in making sure that the services they provide are
done correctly and safely. The aviation industry is no
exception. With the FAA being more reactive than
proactive, a good hard analytical review of SUPS in the
manufacturing system must be done. In many respects this
is happening, but one may consider if it is fast enough to
prevent a SUP fiom causing an air disaster. For such an
important issue as aviation safety, is does seem unusual that
elements such as counterfeit or unapproved parts could be
so pervasive, for so long, in the system. Then again, it is an
awesomely large system, so getting a handle on it poses a
herculean challenge. This emphasizes the point that the
FAA may not be able to do this with its own resources.
Making FAA advisory circulars such as No. 21-29B
mandatory, increasing civil and criminal penalties for
counterfeiting, and developing an electronic scanning and
data base for all in the aviation industry to use to know who
has been involved with unapproved parts is all fine and
good, but it does not go to the heart of the problem. The
smartest of crooks will learn how to circumvent a system,
and the areasjust listed are not enough to deter individuals
trying to make easy money dishonestly. It is up to the
aviation industry to invest in the resources and control
concepts, be it man or machine, to stop the excessive use of
SUPS. However, like many things that are not right,
throwing money at something is only a partial remedy.
There are too many incorrect issues for our government to
throw money at.
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We as a society have to rate the risks involved with
suspected unapproved parts (SUPS)use, and determinehow
much chance we want to take in air travel. If one portion of
our government regulatory authority claims that SUPSdo
not pose any significant risk, then is this enough to satisfy
the majority of our population? After all, the FAA is the
expert in the aviation field. Much of this falls back on
supply and demand economics, and the need for tight
regulatory control to curb the use of SUPS. The key is to
think creatively, and "out of the box" to fmd better ways to
enforce such a problem as SUPs, and that helps to reduce
the chance of harm in terms of severity and probability.
From the work being done to date in aviation, it appears
that this is in fkct taking place, and we can only collectively

hope that aircraft accidents due to SUPS, or any other
cause, will not occur. Nevertheless, relying on chance and
playing the odds is not a foundation for a system safety
approach. Control measures must be brought into place to
significantly diminish the threat of SUPs installation on
aircraft. The FAA, and other organizations, can take
fiuther steps to plan, manage, and conduct a reliable system
safety program so that SUPS are not as prevalent in the
complex parts supply system.The hazards regarding SUPS
have been identified, and the hdamental goal is to reduce
the risks for the traveling public.

Steven J. Sletten is a Master's Degree Candidate in Aviation Management and Safety at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical
University. He is a graduate of Wittenberg University and is a licensed and certified profkssional geologist. He has
specialized in the area of hydrogeology as a government regulator and environmental consultant.

REFERENCES

Control of the supply chain is shifting. (1999, July). IIE Solutions, 3 l,7.
Dealing with bogus plastic parts in the medical industry. (1998, January 5). Design News. 53,162. Department of
Defense. (1997). Standard practice for svstem safety promam reauirements @OD Publication MIL-STD-882D).
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Ofice.
Department of Transportation. (1994). Suspected unapproved parts. [Review of the Federal Aviation
Administration video cassette program].
parts' promam plan (FAA Publication).
Department of Transportation. (1995). Swected 'una~~roved
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Department of Transportation. (I 998). Detecting and reporting su-ed
unapproved parts (FAA Publication AC
No. 21-29B). Washington, DC:U.S. Government Printing Office.
Freeberg, S.J. (1999, December 11). The military scrapes for spares. National Journal, 31,17.
International Anticounterfeiting Coalition (February 2000). [On-line]. Available: http://www.ari.neff iaccl
Paige, S. (1999, Sept. 27). Air-parts pirates crash and burn. Insight on the News, 15, 13-15.
Proctor, P. (1999, May lo). Parts for older boeings. Aviation Week & Space Technologv. 150,17.
Proctor, P. (2000, February 2 1). Industry outlook. Aviation Week & Space Technolow. 152,33.
Purdue University Public Affiirs Video Archives (1995). Unapproved airplane parts and air safety: Senate
governmental affiirs subcommittee [Review of the video program United States Conmess. Senate. Governmental affiirs
subcornmitteel. C-SPAN (Television network).
Spare parts in high demand. (1998). Airhance Journal, 52-55.
Stephenson, J. (1991). System safety two thousand. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Page 16

https://commons.erau.edu/jaaer/vol9/iss3/4

JAAER, Spring 2000

6

